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The Lone Wolf – Solo Terrorism and the Challenge of
Preventative Prosecution
Kendall Coffey
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, as we will never forget, al-Qaeda’s elaborate planning and deployment of numerous terrorist agents resulted
in shocking destruction and 2,976 deaths. Since the time of those
shattering atrocities, though, threats within our borders have centered
increasingly not on concerted activities but on solo actors of terror1
ism. This emerging threat – often described as “Lone Wolf Terror2
ism” – has seen efforts that were tragically successful including the
2009 shooting rampage that left thirteen dead at Fort Hood. Others
have come frighteningly close to carnage, such as the 2010 attempt to
detonate explosives in Times Square. Reports indicate that in recent
years most Islamic terrorist plots in the United States do not employ
multiple agents in concert and instead are perpetrated by a “Lone
3
Wolf.” Recognizing this growing danger, President Barack Obama
observed that single actor terrorism was “the most likely scenario that
4
we have to guard against right now.” When an individual acts alone –
and does not communicate destructive intentions to others – that per1

rorist,

See Patrick Jonsson, How Undercover Agents Nabbed ‘Lone Wolf’ U.S. Capitol Ter-

THE
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Feb.
23,
2012),
http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/how-undercover-agents-nabbed-lone-wolf-us-capitolterrorist?page=-full.
2
Raffaello Pantucci, A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist
Terrorists, THE INT’L CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF RADICALISATION & POLITICAL VIOLENCE
(Apr. 2011), http://icsr.info/publications/papers/1302002992ICSRPaper_ATypologyofLoneWolves_
Pantucci.pdf. In the analysis published by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, the term “Lone Wolf terrorist” refers to “individual pursuing Islamic
terrorist goals alone, either driven by personal reasons or their belief they are not of any ideological group…” Id. at 9.
3
Jonsson, supra note 1.
4
Officials
Worry
About
Solitary
Terrorists,
UPI
(Aug.
18,
2011),
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/08/18/Officials-worry-about-solitary-terrorists/UPI-2225
1313648694/; see also Jason Ryan, Texas Student Khalid Aldawsari Arrested on Terror Charges;
Target George W. Bush, ABC NEWS (Feb. 24, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/texancharged-plans-bomb-bush-home-dams-nuclear/story?id=12990927#.UC6Ex46Pf3Q (“. . . the arrest
of Aldawasari is alarming to counterterrorism officials because he was largely undetected . . .”).
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son is far more likely than a collaborative to remain invisible until the
moment of attack. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano
underscored the difficulty of prior detection in these circumstances:
“[B]y their very definition, they’re not conspiring with others, they
may not be communicating with others, there’s very little to indicate
5
that something is under way.” Emphasizing the stealth strategies
available to lethal soloists, Andres Breivik, who used guns and bombs
to kill seventy-seven people in Oslo, Norway, wrote shortly before his
attacks in July 2011: “Solo Martyr Cells are completely unknown to
6
our enemies and have a minimal chance of being exposed.”
II. THE “LONE WOLF” THREAT
Because terrorism is usually driven by beliefs that are shared with
others, it may seem anomalous that one would act apart from that
network and without active accomplices. 7 Yet several reasons seem to
8
account for rising perils from solitary perpetrators of terrorism. First,
since September 11th, United States military forces abroad and law
enforcement at home have relentlessly pursued a highly effective
9
campaign against Jihadist groups. Osama Bin Laden was one of
many in al-Qaeda who were eliminated through arrest or military action, leaving the organization reeling and perhaps incapable of return-

5
Paul Cruickshank & Tim Lister, The Lone Wolf-the Unknowable Face of Terror, CNN
OPINION (Feb. 18, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-18/opinion/opinion_lone-wolfterror_1_lone-wolf-terror-attack-lone-terrorists?_s=PM:OPINION.
6
Id. at 4.
7
In the Code of Federal Regulations, terrorism is defined as “the unlawful use of force
and violence against person or property to intimidate or coerce a government population or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) 2010.
8
The ICSRPV classifies lone wolves into four distinct groups. See generally Pantucci,
supra note 2, at 14-30. The “loner” is an individual actor who, without the any external command or control, plans or carries out an act of terrorism by him or herself. Id. at 14. Similar to
the “loner,” the “lone wolf” operates in the real world alone, but has some form of contact with
members of a terrorist organization on the Internet. Id. at 19-20. The “lone wolf pack,” as one
can imagine, consists of a group of lone wolves operating outside any formal structure or command. Id. at 24-25. Finally, the “lone attacker” will carry out an act of terrorism alone, but will
do so under the direct order of a terrorist organization like al Qaeda. Id. at 29-30. Distinct from
the “lone wolf” or “lone wolf pack,” the “lone attacker” has actual connections and regular
contact with organizations. Id.
9

Hearing before the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence U.S. House of Representa-

112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Matthew G. Olsen), available at
http://www.nctc.gov/press_ room/speeches/dnctc_testimony_before_hpsci_111006.pdf [hereinafter Olsen] (“Counterterrorism successes and sustained pressure have left al-Qaeda at its weakest
point in the last ten years, and significantly degraded the group's ability to conduct attacks outside of South Asia. This is exemplified by the lack of a successful operation in the West since
the 2005 transportation bombings in London. Further, the killing of Usama bin Ladin [sic] in
May and last month’s killing of al-Qaeda’s newest deputy, Atiyah abd al Rahman, mark strategic
milestones in our fight against al-Qaeda and are likely to accelerate al-Qaeda‘s decline.”).

tives,
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ing to its former capacity for organized destruction. 10 Meanwhile,
within the United States, prosecutors and investigators have had great
11
Utilizing the prosecutorsuccess against domestic terror cells.
friendly laws of conspiracy as well as aggressive undercover and sur12
veillance operations, they have targeted groups across the country
with striking success. Additionally, apparently recognizing the serious, perhaps irreversible, destruction to its leadership and infrastructure, al-Qaeda itself has encouraged solo terrorists to act. Its Yemen
branch even published a magazine article in English, inciting attacks
by lone operatives and providing a recipe, “How to Make a Bomb in
13
Your Mom’s Kitchen.” Al-Qaeda also released a video soliciting
14
unilateral violence titled, “You Are Only Responsible for Yourself.”
Along with growing recognition – by United States authorities as
well as terrorists – that a single perpetrator is less detectible, is the
reality that deadly results can be achieved without accomplices. Today, perhaps more than ever before, a collective’s destructive belief
can be advanced without collective action. In the Internet age, neither group training nor group reinforcement is required for an actor’s
lethal agenda. The websites, social media, and online chat rooms give
a potential terrorist access to information about everything from guns
15
and explosives to government facilities, while also creating instant
10
11

Id.
Id.

12 Federal prosecutors have convicted more than 90% of terrorism-charged defendants on
at least one count of terrorism according to a study conducted by Human Rights First. The
study examined 257 cases of terrorism from 9/11 through the end of 2007. Fact Sheet: Prosecuting and Detaining Terror Suspects in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 09 Op. Att’y Gen. 564
(June 9. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-564.html (citing In Pursuit of
Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Court, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST). “Since the
1990s, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y) has investigated and successfully prosecuted a wide range of international and domestic terrorism cases —
including the bombings of the World Trade Center and U.S. Embassies in East Africa in the
1990s. More recent cases include those against individuals who provided material support to alQaeda and other terrorist groups, as well as against international arms trafficker Monzer al
Kassar and the Somalian pirate charged in the hijacking of the Maersk Alabama.” Id. Not only
have federal prosecutors had great success securing convictions, but the United States has also
frozen over $139 million funds and assets and has seized more than $60 million in funds and
assets, all aimed at aiding terrorism. Department of the Treasury, Budget of The United States
Government, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE (Feb. 2, 2004), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/BUDGET-2005-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2005-BUD-25.pdf; see also Winning The War on
Terror, Budget of The United States Government, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE (Feb.
2, 2004), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2005-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2005-BUD-7.pdf.
13 Paul Cruickshank & Tim Lister, The ‘Lone Wolf’ – The Unknowable Face of Terror,
CNN (Feb. 18, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/02/18/opinion/lone-wolf-terror/index.html.
14
15

Id.

Olsen, supra note 9, at 6 (“Al-Qaeda core and some of its regional affiliates have repeatedly encouraged independent attacks, which could further encourage violent acts. Increasingly sophisticated English-language propaganda, including Inspire magazine, that provides
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messages of hate to intensify the motivation for terrorism. There is no
need for a would-be Jihadist to attend meetings with other radicals
where an FBI informant might be present. With all of the information
that can be obtained on websites and Internet articles, a potential terrorist has much less need than before to seek others for training in
classes that could be more easily subject to surveillance by law enforcement. As FBI Director Robert S. Mueller observed, “[W]e have
seen a rise in websites that promote jihad and give step-by-step in16
structions on how to build suicide vests and explosives.”
Today, would-be Jihadists can, in effect, conduct their own home
schooling on creating destructive devices and selecting targets of terrorist opportunity. Moreover, through the Internet, a loner cannot
only become better informed but dangerously energized through on17
As President
going reinforcement of prejudices and paranoias.
Obama explained in an interview, “When you’ve got one person who
is deranged or driven by a hateful ideology, they can do a lot of dam18
age and it’s a lot harder to track down those lone wolf operators.”
Recent lone wolf scenarios have seen varying stages of operational progress at the time of detection. In some instances, terrorist
operations were actually initiated before the menace became known.
In the worst of the solo attacks, United States Army Major Nidal Hassan shot 13 people to death at Fort Hood, Texas, in a November 2009
19
rampage that also wounded almost twenty-four more victims. In

extremists with guidance to carry out homeland attacks remains easily available via the Internet.
English-language web forums also foster a sense of community and further indoctrinate new
recruits, both of which can lead to increased levels of violent activity.”); see also Susan B. Glasser & Steve Coll, The Web as Weapon, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/08/AR2005080801018_3.html
(describing how the Internet and online forums are used to disseminate ideological rhetoric and
to provide instructions on how to, among many things, make and use explosives); Gabriel Weimann, Terrorists and Their Tools – Part II, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE (Apr. 26, 2004),
http://yaleglobal.ya le.edu/content/terrorists-and-their-tools-–-part-ii (“They can learn from the
Internet about the schedules and locations of targets such as transportation facilities, nuclear
power plants, public buildings, airports and ports, and even counterterrorism measures.”).
16 Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the Executive
Club of Chicago (Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/fightingterrorism-yesterday-today-and-tomorrow/.
17 Reinforcement and encouragement can push some would-be terrorists across the line
from aspirational to operational. “Cromitie was unlikely to commit an act without the support
of the FBI source . . . .” United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
18 Obama: ‘Lone Wolf’ Terror Attack Biggest Concern, YAHOO NEWS (Aug. 16, 2011),
http://news.yahoo.com/obama-lone-wolf-terror-attack-biggest-concern-223347040.html [hereinafter Obama: ‘Lone Wolf’ Terror].
19

Army Charges Fort Hood Shooting Suspect With 32 Counts of Attempted Murder,

FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2009/12/02/army-charges-fort-hoodshooting-suspect-counts-of-attempted-murder/ [hereinafter Army Charges Fort Hood Shooting
Suspect]; see also Gunman Kills 12, Wounds 31 at Fort Hood, MSNBC.COM,

2011]
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addition to cases of tragic results, there have been terrorist attacks
that were actually launched but failed to succeed due to malfunctioning materials or other operational failures. Thus, a single terrorist was
20
able to plant explosives in New York’s Times Square while the socalled “Underwear Bomber” succeeded in boarding a commercial
21
aircraft and partially ignited explosives. Tragedies were averted because of failed detonations rather than prior detection.
Fortunately, with the overwhelming majority of lone wolf efforts,
law enforcement has intercepted would-be killers before their plans
advanced to a point of extreme danger. At times aided by citizen diligence, early awareness has led to intensive surveillance and covert
interaction with the suspect until the time of arrest and indictment. In
some instances, investigations have been initiated based on concrete
22
evidence of terrorist activity. With others, most of the ingredients of
criminality were largely furnished by undercover law enforcement
agents who enticed suspects to participate in criminal acts that may
23
not have otherwise materialized.
This article examines the lone wolf terrorist and the legal strategies that are deployed to combat this accelerating threat of terrorism.
With respect to schemes that progressed to actual operations, important questions arise as to whether more could have been done to
avert disaster. As to terrorist activities that were uncovered in early
stages, valuable lessons may be derived as to how such success was
achieved. In some instances, questions will continue to be debated as
to whether the target was a would-be terrorist or a wannabe loose
talker who was criminalized through law enforcement enticement.
These issues and more will be engaged in paragraphs that follow.
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Plotting and executing a terrorist attack without commands from
an organization represents a deadly tradition. In the nineteenth century, Mihkail Bakunin, the infamous Russian anarchist, described the

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/33678801/ns/us_newscrime_and_courts/t/gunman-kills-w#.T4TVRW
_G6V8 (last updated Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Gunman].
20 Indictment, United States v. Shahzad, No. 10-cr-00541, 2010 WL 2464622 (S.D.N.Y.,
2010).
21 Indictment, United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 2:10-cr-20005, 2010 WL 22849 (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 6, 2010).
22 See generally Complaint, United States v. Aldawsari, No. 11-MJ-017, 2011 WL 668355
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint Aldawsari].
23 United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Complaint, United
States v. Khalifi, No. 1:12-MJ-87, 2012 WL 517540 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2012).
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24
concept of “propaganda by deed” and advocated that solitary assassins should kill individuals who represented the corrupt social struc25
ture. Among other things, acting individually allowed anarchists to
avoid being bogged down by the coercive power usually associated
26
with large, hierarchal organizations. Although in the early 1900’s
27
lone wolf terrorism fell out of favor with many anarchists, terrorism
by single perpetrators accelerated later in the century. Lone wolves
killed 7% of United States terrorism victims during 1955-1978, a rate
28
that increased to 26% from 1978-1999. White supremacy, Islamist
fundamentalism, anti-abortion, and nationalism/separatism have been
the most prevalent ideological agendas for lone wolves in recent
29
years. But the best known cases actually reflect a wider range of motivations.
Leon Czolgosz, an anarchist and one of the earliest known lone
wolves in American history, shot and killed President William McKinley after hearing a speech by a prominent figure in the anarchist
30
movement. On September 6, 1901, Czolgosz waited in line for his
turn, greeted the President at a reception, and then shot him twice in
31
the abdomen. McKinley died a week later.
From 1940 to 1956, George Metesky, enraged at his employer’s
denial of his disability claim after suffering a debilitating injury on the
32
job, planted approximately thirty bombs in New York City. He usually targeted public places, fixing explosives to the outside of a utilities
33
building and to the bottom of seats in movie theaters. Metesky’s acts
of terrorism never killed anyone but did injure seven people.34
Millions will continue to debate whether the assassinations of
President John F. Kennedy in 1963 and of Dr. Martin Luther King in
1968 were single perpetrator crimes or terrorism orchestrated by con-

24 Lone-Wolf Terrorism, INSTITUT VOOR VELLIGHEIDS-EN CRISISMANAGEMENT, 12
(June
6,
2012),
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/LoneWolf%20Terrorism.pdf [hereinafter Lone-Wolf Terrorism].
25
26
27
28

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14. It should be noted that these figures assume that a lone wolf is either an unaf-

filiated individual who commits an act of terrorism, but can also include a group of up to 3 individuals unconnected with some other group that commit an act of terrorism. See id. Thirty
unaffiliated individual terrorist cells were identified from 1968-2007 in the United States, accounting for almost 42% of all identified cases of unaffiliated terrorism in the world. Id.
29 Lone-Wolf Terrorism, supra note 24, at 20.
30 Leon Czolgosz, SPARTACUS EDUCATIONAL, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/
USAczolgosz.htm (last visited April 11, 2012).
31
32
33
34

Id.
Lone-Wolf Terrorism, supra note 24, at 98.
Id.
Id.
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spiracies. Most agree, though, that Sirhan Sirhan acted alone when he
assassinated Senator Robert F. Kennedy on May 6, 1968, in Los An35
geles, California. Born a Palestinian, Sirhan’s diary revealed that he
attacked Senator Kennedy because of his support for Israel and his
36
pledge to send bombers to that country.
Ten years later, Ted Kaczynski, known as the “Unabomber,” began a deadly bombing campaign. Starting in 1978, he placed or
37
mailed sixteen bombs until his eventual arrest in 1996. He had left a
tenure-track position as a mathematician at the University of California to begin living a solitary life in a remote mountain cabin. Identify38
ing himself as an anarchist, Kaczynski believed that a technological
society is ultimately incompatible with individual freedom and must
39
His attacks
therefore be destroyed in order to free humanity.
40
wounded twenty-three and killed three. Kaczynski is spending the
rest of his life in a maximum security federal prison.
IV. LONE WOLF ATTACKS SINCE 9/11
A. Undetected Operations
The wide array of beliefs and ideologies that motivated soloist
terror in the past added to the challenges of developing meaningful
profiles and predicting future perpetrators. In the last few decades,
though, a Jihadist agenda is emerging increasingly as a common denominator. The worst mass murder since September 11, 2001 that has
been linked to a Jihadist agenda was the Fort Hood murder spree allegedly perpetrated by Major Nidal Hassan, a United States army
psychiatrist. Using firearms, he went on a rampage in November
2009, killing thirteen people and attempting to kill many more before
41
he was shot and paralyzed. Much of the motivation for Hassan’s
murderous binge remains unclear. And yet his proclamation that day
as he stood on a desk declaring, “Allhu Akbar,” the Arabic phrase

35
36
37

Id. at 98-99.
Id.
Id. at 99-100.

38 HEATHER GAUTNEY, PROTEST AND ORGANIZATION IN THE ALTERNATIVE
GLOBALIZATION ERA: NGOS, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND POLITICAL PARTIES 199 (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009).
39 Paul Cooijmans, Comment on the Unabomber's Manifesto, http://www.paulcooijmans.
com/psychology/unabomber.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (“The Unabomber's central and
fatal conclusion can be summed up as: Technological society is incompatible with individual
freedom and must therefore be destroyed and replaced by primitive society so that people will
be free again.”).
40 Lone-Wolf Terrorism, supra note 24, at 99.
41 Army Charges Fort Hood Shooting Suspect, supra note 19.
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for “God is Great,” coincides with other evidence indicating a violent
42
reaction towards perceived American aggression against Muslims.
Hassan used guns, the simplest tools for terrorists, rather than explosives. In contrast to homemade explosives, where the acquisition of
key ingredients may create clues, terrorist symptoms are much less
apparent with firearms and less likely to prompt intervention. In a
society where the possession of handguns is now an individual consti43
tutional right, it is problematic and likely unrealistic to prevent access to guns except for those who have already been convicted of a
felony or adjudicated mentally ill.
Hassan had no prior criminal history to suggest that a military of44
ficer and trained medical doctor could erupt in such heinous fury.
News reports indicate that Hassan was “pretty upset” about his pending deployment to Iraq, and he had recently received poor perfor45
mance reviews. By themselves, though, these circumstances do not
comprise a catalyst for a killing spree. More intriguing are reports
about e-mail exchanges, radical statements, and Internet postings that,
46
if substantiated, would have signaled a dangerous mindset.
While the trial of Hassan may shed further light about the preventability of his crimes, when Abdul Haqim Mujahid Muhammad
killed one victim and wounded another at an army recruiting office in
Memphis, Tennessee, prior concerns were apparent, but no action had
47
been taken. Once a normal teenager from a solid family upbringing,
Muhammad had rejected his own culture and had adopted Islam by
42

Id.
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Gunman, supra note 19.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Some reports linked Hasan to radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. See Neal Conan and
Dina Temple-Raston, FBI Tracks Possible Military Insider Threats, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO
43

(June 27, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/06/27/155849671/fbi-tracks-possible-military-insiderthreats. According to NPR, there were in all “16 emails between Anwar al-Awlaki and Nidal
Hasan, and that's a lot of emails. And they - the Department of Defense and the FBI didn't
share information on that.” Id. According to a Fox News report, “The information about Hasan’s contact with al-Awlaki, who was killed Sept 30, 2011, in a CIA-led operation in Yemen,
was reportedly not shared by the JTTF in Washington, D.C., with army investigators . . . . Fox
News confirmed that Hasan openly saw suicide bombings as justified and cited the writings of
Usama bin Laden on at least three occasions.” Catherine Herridge, Exclusive: Outside Review
of Massacre at Fort Hood To Be Filed Soon, Calling For Change at FBI, FOXNEWS.COM (July 6,
2012),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/07/05/exclusive-independent-fort-hood-calls-forchange-at-fbi/#ixzz21544SiRe. If there was a single point of failure, Hasan's email contact with a
known terrorist was never connected to his radical statements as an Army officer and psychiatrist. Id.
47 James Dao, A Muslim Son, a Murder Trial and Many Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/us/17convert.html; Robert A. Martin,
Affidavit of Search & Seizure Warrant (No. 8766) (Dist. Ct. Little Rock Ark., 2009), available at
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/988.pdf.
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the time of his early twenties. 48 Afterwards, he traveled to Yemen to
learn Arabic and married a Yemini woman. When Yemeni officials
found fake Somali papers on Muhammad, they arrested him, con49
cerned that Somali was a training ground for Islamic extremists. Following that arrest, Muhammad was interviewed by the FBI. Through
his family’s efforts, the United States Department of State intervened
50
to seek his release. Ultimately, Muhammad’s trial in Yemen was
avoided as a result of the United States government’s entreaties, and
he was deported and returned to the United States, but his alienation
51
intensified and his radicalization deepened.
Following the murderous shootings, Muhammad pled guilty and
52
His father, Melvin Bledsoe, was griefreceived a life sentence.
stricken, not only for his son but also for the victims. In March 2011,
Bledsoe submitted a statement to the Committee on Homeland Security decrying the lack of awareness about the radicalization of young
people and the failure to take preventative measures in his son’s
53
case. In those comments, he pointed out that, although the FBI was
alarmed by the beliefs disclosed during Muhammad’s October 2008,
54
interview, that information was not shared with his family. Nor did
the family have an opportunity to share its deepening concerns about
Muhammad’s radicalization with federal agents. As a result, according to Bledsoe, the indoctrination of his son progressed to a point
where al-Qaeda members “convinced him to get revenge on Ameri55
56
ca.” Bledsoe blamed the “wrong caused by political correctness”
and emphasized that more action needed to be taken with respect to
Islamic extremism. 57 Expressing the hope that other children would
not be similarly manipulated, Bledsoe said, “We must stop these extremist invaders from raping the minds of American citizens on
58
American soil.”
It was not prior detection but an operational failure that saved
lives when Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate explosives inside a
48

Dao, supra note 47.

49

Id.
Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and that Community’s Response: Hearing Before the Comm. Of Homeland Sec. 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of
available
at
Melvin
Bledsoe,
private
citizen),
50

http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Bledsoe.pdf.
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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rental car in the middle of New York’s Times Square. As a naturalized United States citizen, Shahzad returned to the United States in
59
February 2010, after spending five months in Pakistan. On May 1,
2011, inside a rented Nissan Pathfinder, he placed multiple tanks filled
with propane gas, gasoline canisters, fertilizer, fireworks, clocks, wir60
ing, and other components to create homemade explosives. His efforts to activate the explosives failed, though, and when smoke was
seen emanating from the car, vigilant police officers evacuated the
area and called in the N.Y.P.D. bomb squad. Law enforcement efforts immediately commenced what led to Shahzad’s arrest two days
later as he attempted to leave the United States on a commercial
61
flight to Dubai. When captured, Shahzad was utterly unrepentant.
Stating that he had received training in explosives in Pakistan, he fully
acknowledged his efforts to explode the bomb and commit mass murder. Shahzad will spend the rest of his life in a maximum security fed62
eral prison.
Also horrifically close to inflicting carnage was Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab. On Christmas Day 2009, the twenty-three year old
Nigerian attempted to explode a suicide bomb on a transatlantic flight
from Amsterdam to Detroit with 290 people on board. 63 While the
64
explosive materials imbedded in his underwear did not detonate, the
resulting fire burned portions of Abdulmutallab’s body. The terrifying proximity to disaster sparked a controversy over whether Ab65
dulmutallab should have been permitted to board that flight. Abdulmutallab’s father, a Nigerian public official, had notified United
59 How Faisal Shahzad Was Caught: Audio From Emirates Airlines Flight, HUFFINGTON
POST (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/04/faisal-shahzad-audio-flightemirates-airlines_n_562776.html.
60
61

Id.
Id.

62 Ron Sherer, Life Sentence for Faisal Shahzad, Could Join Shoe Bomber in Colorado,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Oct.
5,
2010),
THE
http://www.csmonitor.com/usa/justice/2010/1005/life-sentence-for-faisal-shahzad.
63 Times Topics – Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/a/umar_farouk_abdulmutallab/index.
html [hereinafter Abdulmutallab].
64 Indictment, United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 2:10-cr-20005, 2010 WL 22849 (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 6, 2010).
65 Less than two weeks after the attack, the Obama administration mandated full-body pat
downs for people flying into the United States from Afghanistan, Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabi, Somalia, and Yemen. Jonathan Alcom, Airport Security,
SECURE AIRPORTS (Jan. 6, 2010), http://secureairports.blogspot.com/2010/01/airportsecurity.html. In addition, citizens from these countries had their carry-ons checked again beSee Airport Security, N.Y. TIMES TOPICS,
fore they boarded the plane.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/subjects/a/airport_security/in dex.html?inline=nyt-classifier (last updated
Aug. 12, 2012).
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States’ authorities that he believed his son had become dangerously
66
Although Abdulmutallab was
committed to Islamic radicalism.
placed upon a watch list, he was not designated for a no-fly status. As
a result, he was able to skirt the watch list by boarding the Delta Airlines flight in Amsterdam and come within moments of exploding a
suicide bomb that would have caused hundreds of deaths. Tragedy
was averted but only because his detonation efforts failed. It is apparent that highly reliable information that Abdulmutallab might be
dangerous did not translate into security measures making him unsuitable for boarding commercial airlines. Described by prosecutors
as “an unrepentant would-be mass murderer,” he was sentenced in
67
February 2012, to life in prison.
Like Muhammad, whose solid family in Memphis deplored his
actions, Abdulmutallab had an eminently respectable family background. He also had, for law enforcement purposes, a clean record.
With both young men, families were deeply worried about their son’s
accelerating radicalization, but the communication between responsible families and responsive authorities failed to make a timely connection.
B.

Prior Detection – Citizens’ Tips Lead to Arrests

Citizen vigilance was the key to detecting the dangerous propensities of Saudi college student Khalid Aldawsari in Lubbock, Texas.
In February 2011, when he attempted to purchase phenol, a component of explosives, Aldwasari was reported to the authorities by a
North Carolina supply company. 68 As authorities later learned, Aldawsari had already acquired three gallons of sulfuric acid and eight
gallons of nitric acid, two key ingredients of bomb-making, both of
69
which were purchased over the Internet. Once alerted, the FBI used
secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act warrants to enter his
apartment. The resulting search disclosed highly incriminating evidence ranging from a journal entry about carrying out attacks inside
the United States to e-mails listing “nice targets” and instructions for
70
converting a cell phone into a detonator. According to the criminal

66
67

Abdulmutallab, supra note 63.
‘Underwear Bomber’ Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Handed Life Sentence, THE

GUARDIAN, Feb 16, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/16/underwear-bombersentenced-life-prison?INTCMP=SRCH.
68 Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Saudi Student is Charged in Texas With Plotting Attacks
N.Y.
TIMES,
Feb.
25,
2011,
at
A16,
available
at
in
the
U.S.,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/us/25 terror.html.
69 Complaint Aldawsari, supra note 22 at 5.
70 Savage, supra note 68.
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complaint filed against Aldawsari, his blog entries included his request to “grant me martyrdom for your sake and make Jihad easy for
71
me only in your path . . . .” Aldawasari’s e-mail account served as
repositories for his research on targets, explosives, and explosive
72
components.
Not only was the evidence of Aldawsari’s deadly objectives
overwhelming, but his capacity to inflict destruction was also clear.
His assembly of components for explosives, along with his studies in
chemical engineering, indicated an extremely dangerous scheme well
on its way to perpetration until a member of the public alerted the
authorities. On June 27, 2012, a federal court convicted Adawsari for
attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. Aldawsari will be
73
sentenced on October 9, 2012 and faces life in prison.
A citizen’s tip also prompted authorities in Waco, Texas to investigate United States Army Private First Class Naser Abdo, following
his purchase of six pounds of gunpowder, shotgun ammunition, and a
74
magazine for a semi-automatic weapon. A twenty-one year old soldier, Abdo had earlier invoked Muslim beliefs to seek conscientious
objector status. His military status, however, was placed on hold fol75
lowing his arrest for child pornography, and in early July 2011, he
went AWOL (Absent Without Official Leave). Following the tip
from the gun store clerk a few weeks later, agents arrested Abdo in a
motel room a few miles from Ft. Hood. Inside his room, agents found
a hand gun, gun powder, shrapnel, pressure cookers, and an article
apparently published by al-Qaeda, “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of
76
Abdo admitted that he intended to construct two
Your Mom.”
bombs and explode them in a restaurant frequented by soldiers. As
he was led from court the day after his arrest, he shouted, “Nidal Hasan Fort Hood,” in apparent tribute to the alleged perpetrator of mass
77
murder. As a result of a store clerk’s vigilance and the ensuing counter-terrorism effort, Abdo’s alleged scheme was stopped within days
71
72
73

Id.; Complaint Aldawsari, supra note 22 at 6.
Complaint Aldawsari, supra note 22 at 4.
Saudi is Convicted in Bomb Attempt, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, at A19, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/28/us/saudi-is-convicted-in-bomb-attempt.html.
74 See Warrant for Arrest, United States v. Abdo, No. W11-167M, 2011 WL 3500841
(W.D. Tex, Aug 1, 2011).
75 AWOL Soldier Indicted in Fort Hood Bomb Plot, YAHOO NEWS (Aug. 9, 2011),
http://news.yahoo.com/awol-soldier-indicted-fort-hood-bomb-plot-204446980.html [hereinafter
AWOL Soldier].
76 Complaint, United States v. Abdo, No. 6:11-mj-00167-JCM, 2011 WL 3211099 (W.D.
Tex, Aug 1, 2011); AWOL Soldier, supra note 75.
77 Accused Ft. Hood Bomb Plotter Charged with Attempted Use of WMD, FOX NEWS
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.myfoxboston.com/story/17774001/accused-ft-hood-bomb-plottercharged-with-attempted-use-of-wmd.
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of potential disaster. 78 Thereafter, Abdo was convicted on July 12,
2012 of six felonies, including planning to blow up a restaurant full of
Fort Hood soldiers and planning to create a weapon of mass destruc79
tion. He faces a life sentence.
C.

Prior Detection - Targeting Suspects Through Undercover Operations

As the fatal and near-fatal cases of lone wolf terrorism demonstrate, solitary schemes provide fewer clues prior to perpetration. To
confront the daunting challenges of prior detection and the frightful
consequences of failure, federal authorities pursue even modest evidence of terrorist leanings with intensity in order to assure that no
stone is left unturned. To unearth any symptom of Islamic militancy,
undercover agents make aggressive attempts to test a subject’s attitudes and potential for destructive conduct. At times, these pursuits
include immersing the subject in unrelenting enticements that, as one
observer suggested, “might be having the effect of turning armchair
80
observers to active radicals.” As with any sting operation, imaginary
81
schemes are created by investigators to bait the trap for the subject.
As a result, questions may arise as to whether a crime was prevented
by law enforcement or effectively created by undercover informants.
The publicly-disclosed facts do not show what made Rezwan
Ferdaus a person of interest in the first place. But when, outside his
mosque in Worcester, Massachusetts, a cooperating witness began
discussing firearms, Ferdaus approached the cooperator to inquire

78 Warrant for Arrest, United States v. Abdo, No. 6:11-mj-00167-JCM, 2011 WL 3500841
(W.D. Tex, Aug 1, 2011).
79 Sarah Kuta, Naser Jason Abdo Sentenced to Life for Fort Hood Plot, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/10/naser-jason-abdo-fort-hood_n_
1764297.html
80 Jonsson, supra note 1.
81 A sting operation is “defined as any effort by the authorities to encourage wrongdoing,
with the intention of punishing the offenses that result.” Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, NELLCO LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (Oct. 9, 2003),
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1229&context=harvard_olin. For example, in
the case of United States v. Nunez, 146 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1998), a police informant asked the
defendant, a drug addict who financed his drug addiction by building and selling explosives to
gangs in Massachusetts, to construct a bomb to kill members of a rival gang. Nunez agreed and
went shopping with the undercover agent for all of the necessary ingredients and parts. Id.
After finishing the job, the defendant handed the bombs in a duffel bag to the officer and in
exchange, the officer paid him $75. Id. Meanwhile, the police informant was wearing a wire and
the car contained a hidden video camera. Id. The police saw and heard everything. Id. Upon
completion of the deal, the police arrested Nunez and charged him with unlawfully possessing
and selling nine pipe bombs. Id. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Id.
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82
According to the cooperator,
about obtaining guns and bombs.
83
“Ferdaus was interested in starting a movement.” As early as the
first meeting with the cooperating witness, Ferdaus described his
knowledge of GPS systems and electronics indicating that he had the
skill to use explosive-filled drone airplanes to attack United States
military facilities. Ferdaus further indicated that he would need fund84
ing to support his violent schemes. Although there was no evidence
of actual contact with any terrorist organization, his plans were detailed. Indeed, he “carefully researched and wanted to carry-out his
plan to attack the Pentagon with remote controlled aircraft,” and he
hoped to make contact with members of al-Qaeda or other potential
85
terrorists. Multiple recordings with the cooperating witness included
Ferdaus describing his goal of “blowing up federal buildings” and
86
“killing persons inside.”
Following Ferdaus’ arrest, the United States Magistrate Judge,
considering whether he should be released on bail, found the defend87
ant to be a “troubled young man” as well as very bright. Noting his
college degree in physics and his considerable knowledge of electronics, the court observed that he “reconfigured twelve cell phones as
‘detonation’ devices and he prepared a video showing others how to
88
make a mobile phone into a ‘detonator.’” As a result, the court had
little difficulty in concluding that Ferdaus was a danger to community
and that the evidence against him was strong even though the actual
tools for them were provided to him by federal agents. On July 20,
2012, Ferdaus pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material support to terrorists and attempting to damage and destroy a federal
building. Sentencing is set for November 1, 2012, and, under the plea
agreement, prosecutors will be asking for a 17-year jail sentence for
89
Ferdaus.
Other cases further confirm that relentless enticement is standard
operating procedure, so that a subject’s proclivities for terror are test-

82 Decision on the Government’s Motion for Detention, United States v. Ferdaus, No.
1:11-cr-10331-RGS, 2011 WL 5909547 (D. Mass Nov. 28, 2011).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 9
86 Id. at 8
87 Indictment, United States v. Ferdaus, No. 1:11-cr-10331-RGS, 2011 WL 5909547, at *9
(D. Mass. Nov. 8, 2011).
88
89

Id.

Denise Lavoie, Mass. Man Admits Guilt in Plot to Blow Up Pentagon, CHICAGO SUN
TIMES (July 20, 2012), http://www.suntimes.com/news/nation/13889039-418/mass-man-admitsguilt-in-plot-to-blow-up-pentagon.html. Four other charges were dropped as part of the plea
agreement. Id.
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ed exhaustively. 90 In the 2011 case of Amine El Khalifi, the undercover operation in Alexandria, Virginia was launched based on evidence that the defendant espoused undertaking violent operations
91
against the United States. Indeed, El Khalifi indicated from the outset of the investigation that he had a “plan to explode a bomb at an
office building in the City of Alexandria containing offices occupied
92
by the U.S. military.” As he continued to discuss his schemes with
undercover operatives, El Khalifi offered details about placing a
bomb in a restaurant that “was frequented by military officials,” as
well as conducting a suicide operation in which he would blow himself
93
up in the United States Capitol Building in Washington, D.C. In
94
fact, he said he “would be happy killing thirty people.” With El
Khalifi’s predisposition for lethal schemes well-established, the informants provided him with supposed tools of the trade, including an
inoperable MAC-X automatic weapon and a jacket supposedly con95
taining a bomb. The discussions also included the prospective pur96
chase of nails, glue, and cell phones to create homemade bombs.
Following extensive surveillance and recordings, federal agents waited
until El Khalifi walked from his car toward the United States Capi97
tol. Then, they arrested him for crimes including an attempt to use a
98
weapon of mass destruction against government property. Although
El Khalifi’s case relied on undercover operatives to provide the apparent means of destruction, those means were delivered into the
hands of a suspect already committed to a terrorist agenda. El Khalifi
pleaded guilty to one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass de99
struction against United States property on June 22, 2012.

90
91

United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Complaint, United States v. Khalifi, No. 1:12-MJ-87, 2012 WL 517540 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17,

2012).
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at ¶ 6.
Id. at ¶¶ 8, 12.
Id. at ¶ 12.
Id. at ¶ 13.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 20.
Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.

M2 PressWIRE, Virginia Man Pleads Guilty in Plot to Carry out Suicide Bomb Attack
NEWSEDGE
(June
25,
2012,
5:52
AM),
U.S.
Capitol,
http://dialog.newsedge.com/portal.asp?site=2007100814443105593225&searchfolderid=pg200710
0814522209759333&block=default&portlet=ep&nzesm=on&display=Crime&action=sitetopics&
mode=realtime&nzenb=left&criteria=%5Btopic%3Dcrime%5D&searchID=730376&datetime=
%5Bt-minus%3D7%5D&hd
laction=story&storyid=%5Bstoryid=hL8LNPDDE9d7-MThuU4BKBe0k-o8RULhStcQSs6Py0a
CCUPZfGS7he6QeeBdOqWFQooDtEWhkgLYrynLPxfSSg**%5D&rtcrdata=on&epname=E
FORE&.

on
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Another lone wolf, Jose Pimental, also known as Mohammed
Yusuf, had apparently studied information about bomb-making that
was published online by al-Qaeda in its English language publication,
Inspire. 100 Fortunately, through a network of smaller police departments, the New York police learned of Pimental’s activities in May
101
2009 and began to monitor him. An informant recorded incriminating statements while the surveillance of Pimental indicated that he
purchased a clock, double piping, Christmas lights, and other compo102
nents of potential explosives. Ultimately, he was videotaped drilling
holes into pipes, an event that prompted his arrest and prosecution
103
Although his plans were far from
under state terrorism charges.
sophisticated or even well-developed, his rhetoric confirmed a dangerous predisposition that warranted the extensive undercover efforts
leading to his arrest.
In September 2009, Michael C. Finton, age twenty-nine, was arrested as he tried to detonate what he believed to be a bomb inside a
104
Finton,
van outside the federal courthouse in Springfield, Illinois.
who also used the name Talib Islam, was an unmarried, part-time
cook who had converted to Islam during the six years he had spent in
105
state prison for convictions of aggravated battery and robbery. The
abundant evidence of his al-Qaeda leanings ranged from his professed
admiration of John Walker Lindh, the so-called “American Taliban,”
to his expressions of interest in the Taliban attack that killed 166 in
106
The investigation began in February 2009 after a
Mumbai, India.
confidential informant introduced Finton to undercover agents. The
false explosives were provided by undercover FBI agents posing as alQaeda operatives following months of surveillance. Charged with an
attempt to murder a federal officer, as well as attempted use of a
weapon of mass destruction against federal property, he pled guilty on
107
May 9, 2009 and received a 28-year prison sentence.
100 Joseph Goldstein & William K. Rashbaum, City Bomb Plot Suspect Is Called Fan of
Qaeda Cleric, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2011), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?

res=9406E1DA1431F932A15752C1A9679D8B63&scp=1&sq=&st=nyt.
101
102
103

Id.
Id.
Id.

104 Indictment, United States v. Finton, No. 10-cr-30215, 2010 WL5641787 (S.D. III. Nov.
29, 2010).
105 Mike Robinson, Michael Finton Charged by FBI For Attempting to Bomb the Springfield Federal Courthouse, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2009/09/24/michael-finton-charged-by_n_298669.html
106
107

Id.

Terry Frieden, Man Sentenced to 28 Years For Plotting to Bomb Federal Courthouse,
CNN JUSTICE (May 9, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-09/justice/illinois.bomb.plot_
1_federal-courthouse-sting-operation-michael-finton?_s=PM:CRIME.
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D. Prior Detection – Creating the Crime?
In the case of James Cromitie, 108 the United States district judge
offered a remarkable description of the defendant’s claim that the
undercover operation violated the due process clause of the United
States Constitution.
Defendant’s renewed motion, made and denied without prejudice prior to the trial, to have the indictment dismissed on the
ground that the Government “created the criminal, and then
manufactured the crime.” (cite omitted). There is some truth to
that description of what transpired here, nonetheless, the motion
109
is denied.
The case began when Cromitie of Newburgh, New York said to a
government witness that he wanted to go back to Afghanistan to obtain a wife because of “the brothers killed in Pakistan and Afghani110
Later statements were even more troubling as Cromitie exstan.”
111
pressed a desire to go to “paradise” because he wanted to “do some112
thing to America.” Even so, for months Cromitie pushed back on
the informant’s attempts to discuss the actual pursuit of terrorist
schemes. 113 Despite his initial militant rhetoric, Cromitie later retracted his statement about going to Afghanistan and also indicated that
114
he did not want to “go that far” with respect to any violent activities.
As Cromitie’s reluctance grew, the FBI made the striking observation
that, “Cromitie was unlikely to commit an act without the support of
115
the FBI source . . . .” Ultimately, Cromitie received all the support
he needed when the FBI’s operative offered him $250,000 and proposed a scheme to target Stewart Air Force Base in Connecticut with
a bomb plot. As the district judge observed:
The Government selected targets . . . . The Government provided every item used in the plot: cameras, cell phones, cars, maps
and even a gun. The Government did all the driving (as none of

108 United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Cromitie who was
charged along with several others, would not be considered a “lone wolf” under most definitions. See Pantucci, supra note 2. Nevertheless, because his action was not directed by other
organizations and because it proceeded operationally like other single actor cases, it is useful
here, especially with respect to examining the highly aggressive government’s tactics.
109 United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
110 Id. at 215.
111 Id. at 217.
112 Id. at 215.
113
114
115

Id.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 218.
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the defendants had a car or driver’s license). The Government
116
funded the entire project.
Ultimately, the court found that even though Cromitie had for
months resisted the undercover ploys, he nevertheless “put himself
back into the Government’s sights” when he was prompted by the
government informant’s $250,000 offer to pursue the Government
117
created plot. In denying the motion to dismiss the indictment, the
court observed that to establish the government’s “over involvement”
in creating criminality, a due process violation only arises if the “outrageous Government misconduct” exceeds all notions of permissible
118
conduct and shocks the conscience of the court. Tellingly, the court
observed that the defense is “... an issue frequently raised that seldom
119
succeeds.”
V. PREVENTATIVE DETENTION V. PREVENTATIVE PROSECUTIONS
A review of reported lone wolf activity demonstrates that even
though some tragic and near-tragic results have occurred, especially in
firearm cases, law enforcement has demonstrated a highly effective
and successful capacity to intervene well in advance of imminent peril.
To be sure, the debate continues over whether more steps and earlier
steps should be taken. Few question the imperative for disabling terrorist schemes long before they are inflicted on Americans. Along the
spectrum between hostile opinions and murderous deeds, earlier is
manifestly better than later because the consequences of acting too
late are so catastrophic.
A. Crimeless Prisoners
The urgency of preventative strategies has prompted an emerging
focus on methodologies that do not require a provable crime. In the
wake of 9/11, the material witness statute was utilized to an unprecedented extent to authorize the temporary incarceration of individuals
whose testimony was allegedly needed and whose presence must
120
Imprisoning these “witnesses” – many of
therefore be secured.
116
117
118
119

Id. at 221.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 213.

120 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33077, ARREST AND DETENTION OF
MATERIAL WITNESSES: FEDERAL LAW IN BRIEF AND SECTION 12 OF THE USA PATRIOT AND
TERRORISM PREVENTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT,
3-4 (2005),
available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl33077.pdf. The federal material witness statute can be
located at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3144 (“If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony
of a person is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracti-
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whom appeared to be persons of interest who were not provable as
criminals – sparked criticism that the material witness law was being
used pre-textually to justify otherwise unconstitutional preventative
detentions. 121 Since the law was conceived to hold only “material witnesses” rather than unchargeable suspects, any such misuse of this
statute would have troubling implications given our nation’s traditional aversion to arresting individuals when no crime is even al122
leged. In the case of Abdullah Al-Kidd, a Kansas native who played
123
college football at the University of Idaho, the potential for abuse
was vividly illustrated. Stopped at Dulles Airport in March 2003,
while en route to Saudi Arabia for doctoral studies, he was arrested as
a “material witness,” confined naked in a cell for many hours, even
124
though no one accused him of any crime. On June 27, 2012, a federal magistrate judge ruled that Al-Kidd was falsely imprisoned and that
125
the material witness law had been abused. Although subject to further review by the United States district judge, this decision nonetheless represented the first ruling against the government on the merits
126
in a post 9/11 material witness case.
As court decisions continue to delineate limits to the material
witness law, a potentially more profound expansion of the government’s capacity to detain preventatively was enacted on January 1,
2012 when President Obama signed into law the National Defense
127
The controversial antiAuthorization Act of 2012 (“NDAA”).
terrorism provisions of the NDAA appear to allow the United States
military to detain individuals without charges or trial – including

cable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of
the person and treat the person in accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of this title.”).
121 Id. at n.3 (highlighting the various criticisms directed at the material witness statute).
122 Preventative detention is utterly contrary to our society. “There could be no more
eloquent demonstration of the coercive power of authority to imprison upon prediction, or of
the dangers which the almost inevitable abuses pose to the cherished liberties of a free society.”
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 766-67 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123 Associated Press, APNewsBreak: Judge Says US Wrongly Held Idaho Man, FOX NEWS
(June 27, 2012, 7:35 PM), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/06/27/apnewsbreak-judge-says-uswrongly-held-idaho-man/.
124 Adam Liptak, Justice to Hear Appeal Over Liability for Detention, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/us/19scotus.html.
125 Associated Press, supra note 123.
126 Nina Totenberg, Court Considers Ashcroft’s Liability in Terror Case, NAT’L PUBLIC
(Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/02/134059232/u-s-citizen-looks-to-supreme-court-forvindication; Associated Press, supra note 123.
127 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2011).
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128
Although the current administration has
United States citizens.
129
expressed its intention not to use such powers against citizens, and
vigorous judicial challenges would await any such efforts, the enactment of this legislation suggests an anxiety about the existing tools for
preventing terrorism.

B.

Existing Federal Laws for Preventative Prosecutions

That anxiety, however, seems unjustified. While the concerns are
understandable, the reality is that federal criminal prosecution in terrorism cases has been remarkably effective. An analysis of more than
120 prosecutions dating back to the 1980’s – many of them focused on
preventing and disabling terrorist activities – demonstrates a convic130
tion rate of 91.1%. Justice has not only been consistent, it has been
forceful. Along with eleven cases of life sentences, the remaining cas131
es resulted in an average of almost 101 months in federal prison.
With multi-actor terrorist schemes, the existing laws for preparatory crimes are clearly adequate for preventative prosecutions of terrorism. Conspiracy laws do not require completed acts of violence
132
but instead center on agreements with illegal objectives. While conspiracy can be charged as a separate crime apart from the substantive
offense, 133 by its nature, this crime requires proof that “the defendant
agreed with at least one other person ‘to try to accomplish a common
134
and unlawful plan . . . .’” Accordingly, even though conspiracy laws
have been expanded significantly to combat terrorism, 135 the essential
128 Erik Kain, President Obama Signed the National Defense Authorization Act – Now
What?, FORBES (Jan. 1, 2012), www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2012/01/02/president-obama-

signed-the-national-defense-authorization-act-now-what/.
129 Statement by President of H.R. 1540, THE WHITE HOUSE: OFFICE OF THE PRESS
SECRETARY (Dec. 31, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/31/statementpresident-hr-1540.
130 James Benjamin, In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal
Courts, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L 267, 268, 270 (2009).
131
132

Id.

As one commentator notes, “the potential to intervene at an early stage along the continuum between inclination and action makes conspiracy a potentially powerful tool for preventative intervention.” Robert Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution and the Preventative
Detention Debate, 50 S.TEX L. REV. 669, 684 (2009). As this article explains, even an informal
membership in the jihad movement may suffice as the crime of conspiracy under current terrorism laws. Id. at 687.
133 United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
134 United States v. Hassoun, 476 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction: Criminal § 13.1 (2003)).
135 Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 306 (analyzing laws criminalizing conspiracy to provide material support to designated terrorist organizations along with more severe penalties); see also
United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 223 n.1 (4th Cir. 2007) (guilty plea in the face of six
different terrorism conspiracy charges ranging from conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction to conspiracy to commit air piracy).
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element of agreeing to act illegally with another would not be efficacious in the case of a true lone wolf.
Along with conspiracy laws, another powerful tool in combating
preparatory terrorism is law proscribing the giving of material assistance to foreign terrorist organizations designated by the United
136
States Secretary of State. Originally enacted in 1996, the “material
support or assistance” laws criminalize giving assistance to organizations such as al-Qaeda, and since 1996, the laws have been legislative137
ly expanded to encompass providing a “service.” These “services”
include “training” as well as “expert advice or assistance.” Significantly, illegal services also include furnishing “personnel,” a key element because one’s own services can constitute providing “personnel”
138
within the meaning of the law.
Based on the definitions for providing “material support or assistance,” a federal appeals court found that an individual’s decision to
offer one’s own services to al-Qaeda constitutes a crime of terrorism
even if nothing further is attempted:
[W]e nevertheless conclude that Augustia and Phanur’s volunteering of their services to Al Qaeda was sufficient for a jury to
deem it material support in the form of personnel. Section
2339A(g)(4) makes clear that providing personnel which means
“(one) or more individuals who may be or include oneself,” con139
stitutes material support under § 2339B.
Along with broad definitions for the scope of “material support
or assistance,” these laws also explicitly encompass crimes of preparation:
By its elements, § 2339A criminalizes material support given in
preparation for the object offense – clearly, the object offense
need not even have been completed yet, let alone proven as an
140
element of the material support offense.
Because laws of conspiracy and providing support to terrorist organizations necessarily implicate associational crimes, they are not
ordinarily tailored for an early arrest of the true lone wolf. As one
court explained the traditional options for preparatory crimes, “. . .the
three inchoate offenses are described as attempt, conspiracy, and so136

See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (“the term “material support or resources” means any property, tangible or intangible, or service . . . .”).
138 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (deferring training); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) (“Expert advice or
assistance”); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) (defining “personnel”).
139 United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1120 (11th Cir. 2011).
140 United States v. Hassoun, 476 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 2007).
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141
licitation. . . .” Because neither conspiracy nor solicitation would, by
definition, apply to a suspected terrorist acting exclusively on his own,
142
lone wolf cases frequently relied on crimes of attempted terrorism.
Because attempted terrorism will likely remain the principal
charge against solitary actors, it is apparent that the needs of early
prevention will continue to rely on aggressive undercover tactics
whenever possible suspects are identified. As demonstrated in the
143
case of James Cromitie, the government’s numerous efforts to induce a suspect to attempt to commit terrorist crimes did not constitute
either entrapment, according to the jury, or a due process violation,
144
according to the district judge. Nor did the government’s heavy involvement justify any reduction in Cromitie’s prison sentence. During
his sentencing, his attorney argued that federal agents deliberately
created a scheme to increase Cromitie’s prison time by introducing a
145
“missile element into the case.” The result was a twenty-five year
146
minimum sentence. Even so, the court denied the defendant’s claim
of “sentencing manipulation” as inapplicable to cases of legislatively
enacted mandatory sentences. In overruling the defense argument,
the district judge acknowledged the high likelihood that the government did indeed add circumstances to the imaginary scheme in order
147
to impose added years upon the ultimate sentence.
As Cromitie illustrates, the government’s ability to target suspects aggressively – offering them proposed details, supposed weaponry, and actual cash – has seemingly few limits. And yet, whatever
may be the enticements, it takes a willing suspect to become an indictable defendant. In rejecting another defense claim that the govern-

141

Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 305 n.14.

142

United States v. Khalifi, No. 1:12-MJ-87, 2012 WL 517540 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2012)
(attempt to sue weapon of mass destruction against U.S. property); United States v. Ferdaus,
No. 1:11-cr-10331-RGS, 2011 WL 5909547 (D. Mass Nov. 8, 2011) (attempt to destroy federal
building attempt to provide material support to terrorist organization); United States v. Finton,
No. 10-cr-30215, 2010 WL5641787 (S.D. III. Nov. 29, 2010) (attempt to murder federal officer).
Some recent laws may provide an additional predicate for preventative action against solo actors
in limited circumstances – receiving “military-type training” from designated foreign terrorist
organizations became a crime in 2004. 18 U.S.C. § 2339(D)(c)(1). Moreover, some of the material support laws do not require a defendant to be acting in concert with others so long as the
actor’s efforts are intended to provide those others with assistance. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).
143 United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
144

Id.

145

Sentencing, United States v. Cromitie, 09 CR. 558 CM, 2011 WL 2693297, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
146
147

Id.
Id. (“None of this changes the fact that the defendants embraced the idea of firing a

missile at government aircraft; it does not vitiate their convictions on Counts 5 and 6. Nor, as I
have already opined, does it constitute the sort of “outrageous government misconduct” that
violates the defendants' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.”).
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ment’s over-involvement violated the due process clause, the federal
appeals court said:
The evidence in this case does not show that the government ran
“the entire operation with only meager assistance from the [appellants].” Rather, the government only provided means to those
who were “willing and predisposed.” 148
Thus, sting operations in terrorism cases may be controversial at
times, but they are a well-accepted law enforcement tactic. Further,
they are essential to counter-terrorism investigations, especially in
single actor scenarios. By definition, the lone wolf suspect does not
operate with accomplices whose loose lips might create leads for law
149
With the formidable challenge of detecting the activienforcement.
ty of solo operators, anti-terrorism investigations are obliged to exhaustively explore any possible symptoms of peril. Often, the tactics
entail extreme activism by federal agents who may spend months testing a suspect’s willingness to cross the line from talking trash about
America to planning violence against Americans. Since the proper
focus is prior interception and prevention of terrorism, though, sting
operations will remain a vital part of anti-terrorism strategies as surely
as they will continue to be vigorously debated.
C.

Preventative Investigations: Data Mining and Monitoring

While the statutory tools utilized for charging crimes of terrorism
are apparent, less obvious are some of the investigative techniques
that are being continually developed and enhanced. Understandably,
the government’s latest methodologies for data mining and electronic
surveillance are generally not made public. In some contexts, though,
the mechanisms for early detection encompass private-public cooperation and are publicly documented.
One such system is set forth in Title 21, Section 830 of the United
States Code: Regulation of Listed Chemicals and Certain Machines.
This portion of the Controlled Substances Act provides for the Suspicious Orders Task Force (SOTF) which requires that:
Each regulated person shall report to the Attorney General. . .
any regulated transaction involving an extraordinary quantity of
a listed chemical, an uncommon method of payment or delivery,
or any other circumstance that the regulated person believes may

148
149

United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1123-24 (11th Cir. 2011).
See Obama: ‘Lone Wolf’ Terror, supra note 18.
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indicate that the listed chemical will be used in violation of [the
150
law].
The act further sets forth guidelines which “assist chemical manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers and retailers to be alert to suspicious
orders involving listed chemicals” by delineating what constitutes a
suspicious amount, payment method, or delivery location. 151 While
the SOTF generally deals with drug-related cases, it applies to hazardous chemicals as well.
In furtherance of such objectives, a “see something say something” campaign was adopted by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to encourage members of the public to report suspicious
152
activity. Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)
established a Public Access Center Unit (“PACU”), which receives
153
In 2003, the FBI launched
and assesses tips on potential threats.
“Operation Tripwire” to enlist specific industries to be on the lookout
154
for terrorist planning or training activities. Since its inception, Operation Tripwire has targeted thirty different industries, including airlines, prisons, and chemical companies, encouraging them to cooperate with FBI agents concerning what may constitute suspicious activi155
When and if anything suspicious or unusual is encountered,
ty.
businesses are encouraged to contact FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task
156
Force.
While specific results of Operation Tripwire may not be disclosed
for security reasons, at least one major success became public. When
Khalid Alaawasri attempted to purchase hazardous chemicals for
bomb-making from Carolina Biological Supply, he was detected, then
157
reported. Because Carolina Biological Supply, a Tripwire participant, apparently had procedures in place to monitor orders involving
the chemicals in question and report any suspicions, it alerted the FBI,

150 21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(1)(A); see also 21 C.F.R. 1310.05(a)(1); Knowing Your Customer/Suspicious Order Reporting, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY: OFFICE

DIVERSION
CONTROL,
usdoj.gov/chem_prog/susp.htm#e1 (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
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http://www.deadiversion.

Id.

152

Information Sharing Environment, Annual Report to The Congress, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, 36 (June 30, 2011), http://www.nctc.gov/itacg/docs/ISE-AnnualReport-to-Congress-2011.pdf.
153

Id.

154

Matthew Harwood, Tripping Up Terrorists, SECURITY MANAGEMENT (Jan. 3, 2012),
http://securitymanagement.com/article/tripping-terrorists-009356?page=0%2C0.
155
156
157
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leading to the investigation and ultimately the arrest and conviction of
158
Alaawasri.
Another important monitoring device was strengthened in 2001
when Congress passed Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act: “the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act of 2001,” to attack terrorist financing by raising barriers
to terrorist access to the United States financial system. Among other
requirements, these sections impose on bank and other United States
financial institutions additional due diligence and record-keeping requirements that are conceived to ascertain possible funding sources
for terrorism. These requirements have apparently contributed to
asset seizures, sanctions, and increased surveillance that has evidently
dealt serious blows to al-Qaeda’s financing. Indeed, the United States
Treasury reports that it has frozen $139 million in assets after 9/11
159
pursuant to these laws.
Systems for detecting hazardous chemicals and suspicious money
can have a meaningful impact in combating terrorism that utilizes explosives or well-financed organizations and operations. But a solo
killer who uses firearms rather than bombs apparently remains the
least preventable form of terrorism. Major Nidal Hassan and Abdul
Haqim Mujahid allegedly succeeded with guns. Would-be bombers,
on the other hand, have been repeatedly intercepted since 9/11 before
killing, even if fortuitously at times.
On August 5, 2012, another single gunman attacked, this time, in
160
Wade Michael Page killed six and
the Sikh Temple of Wisconsin.
wounded three before police bullets and self-inflicted wounds com161
bined to kill him. Linked to white supremacy groups, Page was the
leader of a so-called hard-rock band, End Apathy, 162and authorities
treated the shooting as an act of domestic terrorism. 163 Like other
158 Id. According to Security Management, “Carolina Biological Supply had known it
should alert the FBI thanks to an FBI program known as Operation Tripwire, designed to enlist
business in the government’s effort to detect terror plots. Tripwire is an example of publicprivate cooperation that appears to be yielding results.”
159 See Department of the Treasury, supra note 12; Sean Paul Ashley, The Future of Terrorist Financing: Fighting Terrorist Financing in the Digital Age, 2 PENN ST. U.J. INT’L AFFAIRS,
no. 1, Spring 2012, at 7. Al-Qaeda’s operations are estimated to cost $30 million annually of AlQaeda’s remaining expenses – some $270 million in investments to administering and maintaining the organization. Id.
160 Erica Goode & Serge F. Kovaleski, Wisconsin Killer Fed and Was Fueled by HateDriven Music, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/us/army-veteranidentified-as-suspect-in-wisconsin-shooting.html?pagewanted=all; CNN Wire Staff, Wisconsin
Siblings Tell of Running to Warn Others as Temple Shooting Erupted, CNN (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/08/us/wisconsin-temple-shooting/index.html?hptzhp12.
161

Id.

162

CNN Wire Staff, supra note 160.
Goode & Kovaleski, supra note 160.
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lone wolf shooters discussed in this article, Page legally acquired his
164
9mm semi-automatic handgun with multiple ammunition magazines.
His background, while troubling, did not place him on the radar of
law enforcement. Some past acquaintances of Page said he spoke in
165
the past of “racial holy war,” but neither family members nor others
166
Although the Southern
had reported any recent warning signs.
Poverty Law Center reportedly had Page’s name on its lists of alleged
white supremists, because he was “one of thousands,” that name was
167
Unfortunately, there may be
not furnished to law enforcement.
more white supremacists than there are resources to effectively moni168
tor all of them.
Another horror, while not connected to a terrorist agenda, also
tragically confirmed America's extreme vulnerability to a solo shooter. On July 20, 2012, in a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, James
169
He had no prior
Holmes allegedly murdered 12 and wounded 58.
criminal record. According to news reports, though, Holmes created
a one man arsenal stockpiling thousands of bullets and head-to-toe
170
ballistic gear, including body armor purchased on eBay. One source
indicated that Holmes picked up 160 pounds of ammunition from a
FedEx stop. 171 Apparently, no one noticed, and website operators
who sell guns, ammunition, and combat gear are not required to con172
duct background checks or engage in detailed record keeping.
While gun control advocates may demand background checks of
potential purchasers, there is no compelling evidence that background
checks would have prevented the violent tragedies at the Wisconsin
173
Sikh temple or in the movie theater in Aurora, Colorado. The 9mm
handgun used by Page and the four guns allegedly used by Holmes
were all purchased legally. In fact, Holmes passed the background

164

CNN Wire Staff, supra note 160.
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Goode & Kovaleski, supra note 160.
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James Holmes Built Up Aurora Arsenal of Bullets, Ballistic Gear Through Unregulated
Online Market, CBS NEWS (July 24, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162169

57478749/james-holmes-built-up-aurora-arsenal-of-bullets-ballistic-gear-through-unregulatedonline-market/ [hereinafter James Holmes].
170 Jack Healy, Suspect Bought Large Stockpile of Rounds Online, N.Y. TIMES (July 22,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/23/us/online-ammunition-sales-highlighted-by-aurorashootings.html?pagewanted=all.
171 James Holmes, supra note 169.
172 Leslie Meredith, Is It Easier to Buy a Gun Online?, TECH NEWS DAILY (July 24, 2012),
http://www.technewsdaily.com/4600-is-it-easier-to-buy-a-gun-online.html.
173 Bloomberg Sets Sights on Illegal Gun Sales Online, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/15/us-usa-guns-online-idUSTRE7BE01Z20111215.
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checks required in person and from online retailers. 174 But arguably
more can be done. Almost assuredly, law enforcement will study the
Sikh temple murders to examine whether more surveillance resources
175
Moreover,
should be allocated to white supremacist hate groups.
176
while the Constitution affords protection to gun ownership, there is
no current doctrine limiting the government’s capacity to undertake
data mining of suspicious activity directed towards stockpiling weapons and ammunition. The SOTF provides a framework for a reporting system by businesses that could be applied to guns, ammunition,
and ballistic gear. The guidelines for identifying suspicious purchases
of certain chemicals, criteria that speak to an “extraordinary quantity”
or “uncommon method of payment or delivery,” may offer a framework for detecting and reporting hazardous firearms and munitions,
VI. CONCLUSION
Plainly, aggressive tactics for investigating and prosecuting lone
wolf terrorism are needed to address a grave danger that is accelerating. Overwhelmingly, law enforcement has demonstrated the effectiveness of existing legal tools for prosecuting terrorists, ranging from
sting operations to today’s substantive anti-terrorism laws. And yet
because the stakes are so high, the public and its leaders understandably seek to pursue ways to do more to prevent terrorism.
Illustrating this pursuit is the ongoing controversy over preventative detention, highlighted by the enactment of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2011. Such a debate, however, should not fail to
analyze the critical question of whether there are demonstrable shortfalls in the existing criminal laws. As with organized schemes, the
results in combatting the growing menace of the lone wolf dispel any
need for crimeless military detention of suspects in order to prevent
destruction. To the contrary, the results of investigation and prosecution have repeatedly demonstrated that when relevant information is
obtained and properly analyzed, the existing undercover strategies
and present laws are highly effective. The few cases where warning
174

Healy, supra note 170.
According to the New York Times, a former Homeland Security analyst complained
that the number of analysts monitoring non-Islamic military has been sharply reduced. Goode
& Kovaleski, supra note 160.
176 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (The Second Amendment protects
an individual’s right to keep and bear arms, “statutes banning handgun possession in the home
violated Second Amendment.”); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (holding
“that Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is fully applicable to the states by virtue
of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
175
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signals were not acted upon were failures to properly diagnose danger
rather than a legal incapacity to act forcefully. Indeed, there are no
reported cases of suspects who were investigated – and deemed candidates for detention – but then released to pursue a destructive
agenda due to the inadequacy of existing laws.
Rather than new laws for arrest and detention that could collide
with constitutional safeguards, the primary challenge should be securing more information of potentially troubling activities, so that existing preventative strategies can be activated. While surveillance and
monitoring resources are properly focused on foreign terrorists organizing activities, the capacity to better assess white supremacist and
other domestic hate groups can be further examined. Moreover, laws
that foster monitoring abnormal transactions involving chemicals and
funds are accepted tools in combatting terrorism. Whether a political
will exists for extending measures to guns and munitions, though, is
177
beyond the scope of this article. Nor could the effectiveness of such
measures be assessed without further study. Tragically, not all terrorism is preventable. When terrorism erupts, especially by a single killer using guns, sometimes a ticking time bomb can be too far below the
radar for anyone to see.

177 Valli Ramanathan, Colorado Shooter James Holmes’ Online Arsenal Rampage Raises
Debate Over Gun Rights and Arms Freedom, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 24, 2012),
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